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ERIC HOFFMANt
Since Roth v. United States, the Supreme Court has maintained
that "obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press."2
This means that, consistent with the usual procedural constraints,3 state
and federal governments can regulate obscene books, photographs, and
movies. 4 At the same time, the Court has developed a restrictive defini-
tion of obscenity that, in effect, limits obscenity regulation to hardcore
pornography. 5
First amendment theorists have widely criticized obscenity law.'
Their arguments tend to focus on the problem of defining obscenity,
and some criticize any attempt to define or regulate obscenity." The
theorists' legal arguments are informed by their perceptions of pornog-
raphy and its social significance; these perceptions may be broadly cate-
gorized as either conservative or liberal.8 The Court's current position
represents a compromise between the conservative and liberal positions,
a position that satisfies neither side.'
Recently, a new voice entered the obscenity law debate. Feminists
have begun to articulate their opposition to pornography, 0 to organize
t B.S. 1973, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Ph.D. 1978, J.D. 1984, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania. The author wrote this Comment while a student at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law School.
1 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
2 Id. at 481.
' See F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 206-27 (1976).
" Most states regulate obscenity. For a categorization of obscenity statutes, see
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 755 n.7 (1982). Federal regulation in the area
includes provisions regulating the use of the mails, see 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1982); 39
U.S.C. §§ 3001, 3008, 3010 (1982), common carriers, see 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1982),
interstate transportation, see 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1982), and importation into the United
States, see 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1982); 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1982). For a discussion of the
history of federal obscenity regulation and a description of current federal law in the
area, see F. SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 169-91.
' See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text (discussing views of liberal
theorists).
7 See infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
a See infra notes 45-59 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
10 See, e.g., A. DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981); S.
GRIFFIN, PORNOGRAPHY AND SILENCE (1981); TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON
PORNOGRAPHY (L. Lederer ed. 1980).
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and demonstrate,11 and to secure the passage of antipornography laws."2
Not all feminists oppose pornography or view it as an important is-
sue, 3 but those who do have advanced arguments informed by a per-
spective that differs fundamentally from both the conservative and the
liberal positions. 4
Feminist arguments against pornography focus on its role in rein-
forcing sexist views and attitudes, which, on one level, simply fail to
treat women as serious human beings and, on another level, sanction
and perhaps promote violence against women.' 5 These arguments re-
flect and are part of a broader attack on the character of sexual rela-
tionships in sexist societies. The arguments do not presuppose that sex
" Several feminist antipornography groups, including Women Against Pornogra-
phy, formed in 1979 in New York, and Women Against Violence in Pornography and
Media, formed in 1976 in San Francisco, have appeared in recent years. These groups
have organized demonstrations, conferences, and workshops. Occasionally, these groups
have taken direct action against particular films, theaters, and bookstores. See Boler,
Lake & Wynne, We Sisters Join Together. . ., in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN
ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at 19; Gever & Hall, Fighting Pornography, in id.
at 261-85; LaBelle, Snuff-The Ultimate in Women-Hating, in id. at 272; Lederer,
Introduction, in id. at 15; Lederer, Women Have Seized the Executive Offices of Grove
Press . . . , in id. at 267.
12 The first such effort took place in Minneapolis, Minnesota. See Ordinance
Amending Title 7 of Minneapolis Code of Ordinances Relating to Civil Rights, (Dec.
30, 1983) (vetoed Jan. 5, 1984). Despite the veto of the Minneapolis ordinance, the
City-County Council of Indianopolis, Indiana passed a similar measure. See City of
Indianapolis and Marion County City-County General Ordinance 24, 1984 (passed
April 23, 1984) (copy on file at University of Pennsylvania Law Review); City of
Indianapolis and Marion County City-County Ordinance 35, 1984 (passed June 11,
1984) (copy on file at University of Pennsylvania Law Review). A federal district court
declared this ordinance unconstitutional in November 1984. See American Booksellers
Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, No. IP 84-791C (S.D. Ind. Nov. 19, 1984).
13 See, e.g., Willis, Feminism, Moralism, and Pornography, in BEGINNING To
SEE THE LIGHT: PIECES OF A DECADE 219 (1981); Ellis, I'm Black and Blue from the
Rolling Stones and I'm Not Sure How I Feel About It: Pornography and the Feminist
Imagination, SOCIALIST REV., May-Aug., 1984, at 103; English, Hollibaugh &
Rubin, Talking Sex: A Conversation on Sexuality and Feminism, SOCIALIST REV.,
July-Aug. 1981, at 43, 56-62. Philipson, Beyond the Virgin and the Whore, SOCIALIST
REV., May-Aug. 1984, at 127; Weir & Casey, Subverting Power in Sexuality, SOCIAL-
IST REV., May-Aug., 1984, at 139, 146; cf. B. FAUST, WOMEN, SEX, AND PORNOGRA-
PHY (1980) (agreeing that pornography is an important issue but criticizing feminist
analysis).
14 The issue of censorship tends to dominate discussions of pornography. Femi-
nists, however, are concerned primarily with encouraging people to think differently
about what pornography means. See, e.g., A. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 9; Russell,
Pornography and the Women's Liberation Movement, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT:
WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at 303-04.
15 Insensitivity to feminist concerns also implicates a general critique of prevailing
legal theory. Conservative legal theory perceives the harm of pornography to be in its
effects upon morality rather than in its other effects on women. Liberal legal theory
moves too quickly from the conclusion that pornography should not be censored to a
relativism in morality and aesthetics that sets a taste for pornography beyond the scope
of rational criticism.
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itself is necessarily degrading or dehumanizing. Feminist criticisms of
pornography instead focus upon its ideological role in maintaining gen-
der relations that harm the status of women generally as well as the
individual women victimized by the violence that is sanctioned and en-
couraged by pornographic materials.1"
This Comment evaluates the feminist argument and considers
whether it can or should be used to justify the legal regulation of por-
nography. Parts I and II contrast the liberal and conservative perspec-
tives represented in judicial opinions and scholarly analysis with the
emerging feminist perspective. Part III articulates the legal proposals
generated by the feminist perspective, and Part IV evaluates these
proposals.
Evaluation of feminist arguments does not lead to a simple accept-
ance or rejection of feminist proposals. Feminist arguments against por-
nography push very hard in the direction of legal regulation; in some
instances, efforts to shape the law in accordance with feminist concerns
have already been made." This Comment argues that insofar as the
law plays a role in defining and shaping social values, pursuit of femi-
nist antipornography laws may well have some value. From a political
perspective, however, feminists should probably avoid endorsing state
regulation of pornography. Feminists have reasons for being suspicious
of the power of the state, which has historically been, and seems likely
to remain, male-dominated. Thus the potential value of feminist anti-
pornography laws may well be offset by considerations of political
strategy as well as first amendment principles.
I. OBSCENITY LAW
A. Legal Doctrine and First Amendment Theory
The first amendment protects freedom of speech primarily to fos-
ter two values: truth, which is supposed to be served by free exchange
in the "marketplace of ideas," and political participation, which re-
18 A well-known formulation of the feminist position argues that "[plornography
is the theory, and rape the practice." Morgan, Theory and Practice: Pornography and
Rape, in GOING Too FAR 163, 169 (1977). For more extensive discussions of this
thesis, see S. GRIFFIN, supra note 10, at 111-19 (discussing both general and individual
harms); Jacobs, Patterns of Violence: A Feminist Perspective on the Regulation of
Pornography, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 5, 9-23 (1984) (discussing both general and
individual harms); LaBelle, The Propaganda of Misogyny, in TAKE BACK THE
NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at 174 (pornography functions as
propaganda against all women); Russell, Pornography and Violence: What Does the
New Research Say?, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra
note 10 at 218 (recent studies have revealed harms to individual women).
17 See supra note 12.
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quires a public forum for the speech of citizens."8 Some scholars argue
that these values, and therefore the scope of protected speech, should be
narrowly construed; others argue for a broad construction on the
grounds that first amendment values can be fully served only by more
extensive protection of free expression.'"
The linchpin of obscenity law since Roth v. United States2" has
been its holding that "obscenity is not protected speech." 2 Although the
definition of obscenity has changed somewhat since Roth, characteriza-
tion of a work as obscene has consistently meant that it is not protected
by the first amendment, with the consequence that the government has
authority to regulate its distribution.22
The legitimacy of this authority is grounded primarily in the idea
that pornography is harmful, or at least that it is reasonable for legisla-
tures to believe that it is harmful.2 3 The Court's opinions also possess a
strain emphasizing dignity, decency, order, and virtue, suggesting that,
even if pornography causes no direct harm, its corrupting influence
harms both the quality of life and the quality of the democratic
18 Considerable debate has been focused on identifying the basic values that free-
dom of speech is meant to promote. See Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA.
L. REv. 591, 591-93 (1982). The values of truth, emphasized in J.S. MILL ON LIB-
ERTY (1859) and of political participation, emphasized in A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM (1960), appear uncontroversial, although there remains disagreement about
how they are to be defined, see, e.g., Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Po-
litical Expenditures and Redish's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 646
(1982); Redish, Self-Realization, Democracy, and Freedom of Expression: A Reply to
Professor Baker, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 678 (1982), and whether these values are the
proper focus for first amendment analysis, see, e.g., Baker, Scope of the First Amend-
ment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964, 990-91 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Baker, Scope of the First Amendment].
19 Compare, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971) ("Constitutional protection should be accorded
only to speech that is explictly [sic] political.") with T.EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 6-7 (1970) (arguing that freedom of expression is essential
for assuring individual self-fulfillment, advancing knowledge, allowing participation in
decision-making, and achieving a more adaptable, and hence, more stable community).
20 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
21 Id. at 486. See also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (reaffirming
that obscene material is unprotected under the first amendment).
22 A distributor may increase her chances of prosecution by pandering; that is,
marketing materials openly advertised to appeal to a customer's prurient interest. See
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1966). And the Supreme Court re-
cently held that distribution of certain nonobscene films and other visual representa-
tions involving children may be restricted to discourage production of such materials.
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760-61 (1982).
23 See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973) (stating that legis-
lature may act "to protect 'the social interest in order and morality' ") (quoting Roth,
354 U.S. at 485, which had quoted Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942)) (footnote omitted and emphasis supplied in Roth).
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citizenry. 24
A doctrinal defense of Roth's exclusion of obscenity from first
amendment protection must rely on an interpretation of obscenity that
explains why it should not be considered speech within the meaning of
the first amendment.25 Writing for the Court in Roth, Justice Brennan
argued that the history of the first amendment implicitly rejects protec-
tion for obscenity because it is "utterly without redeeming social impor-
tance."26 This conclusion was largely premised upon the Court's judg-
ment, made in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,27 that obscene utterances
"are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be de-
rived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality."28 Because the aim of the first amendment is to protect
the marketplace of ideas, it follows that obscenity cannot be protected
speech.29
Assuming that obscenity justifiably may be excluded from the pro-
24 See, e.g., Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58-63 (1973).
25 It could be argued that, even if obscenity is speech, the balance of interests
favors its suppression. In contrast to the Court's more formalistic approach, this argu-
ment would have to rely on some empirical proof that pornography is harmful. Find-
ings of fact based upon empirical data are not unknown to constitutional adjudication,
see, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 & n.l1 (1954), but the Court has
tended to avoid confronting the empirical issues implicated by obscenity cases. But see
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 n.9 (1982) (citing studies of harms caused by
use of children as subjects in pornography).
28 Roth, 354 U.S. at 484. But cf. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)
("We do not adopt as a constitutional standard the 'utterly without redeeming social
value' test.") (quoting plurality opinion in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of
a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966)) (emphasis
supplied in Miller).
21 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
28 Id. at 572 (footnote omitted), quoted in Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (emphasis sup-
plied in Roth).
29 Professor Schauer forcefully articulates the premises of this argument. Accord-
ing to Schauer, "Sex in and of itself is not protected by the first amendment....
Underlying all of the words of [the Supreme Court's obscenity cases] is the assumption
that hardcore pornography is sex." Schauer, Speech and "Speech"-Obscenity and
"Obscenity": An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO.
L.J. 899, 926 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Schauer, Speech]. Because conduct in and of
itself is not protected by the first amendment, his identification of pornography as con-
duct rather than speech removes it from the amendment's protection. The scope of the
argument is limited, however, by its reliance upon a narrow construction of obscenity.
Only hard-core pornography, most of which is pictorial, can plausibly be thought to
have solely a physical effect and no cognitive content. It also does not follow that ob-
scenity ought to be suppressed, but only that its suppression would not violate anyone's
right to freedom of speech. See id. at 933; see also Finnis, "Reason and Passion": The
Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and Obscenity, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 222, 242
(1967); Schauer, Response: Pornography and the First Amendment, 40 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 605, 617 n.47 (1979). Another interpretation of the Roth argument is that por-
nography expresses ideas-but not ideas having any social importance.
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tection of the first amendment, the crucial problem is to distinguish the
obscene from the nonobscene. The evolution of the definition of obscen-
ity culminated in Miller v. California," which held that material is
obscene if,
(a). . . 'the average person, applying contemporary commu-
nity standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest . . .; (b) . . . the work de-
picts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) . . .
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary artistic,
political, or scientific value."1
For the most part this definition classifies as legally obscene only
what might intuitively be thought of as hard-core pornography. 2 Its
narrow scope can be demonstrated by contrasting four of its features
with alternative formulations that would permit more extensive govern-
ment regulation of obscene materials. First, the definition refers to the
"average person" rather than to children or to the easily corrupted.33
Second, the definition requires that the work be "taken as a whole" and
does not permit parts to be evaluated out of context.3 4 Third, the defini-
tion requires that the depictions be "patently offensive," which means
that not all sexually explicit material will be obscene." Fourth, the
work, itself must be relatively worthless; "serious" work is protected. 6
Although the Miller standard is relatively narrow in scope, it re-
quires courts and juries confronting obscenity questions to evaluate the
content of the work at issue. They must decide whether a work "ap-
peals to the prurient interest," whether it depicts sexual conduct "in a
patently offensive way," and whether it "lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value." These inquiries are aesthetic because their
resolution requires analysis and judgment of the content of images and
its effect on an audience. 7 Liberal Justices and commentators tend to
so 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
31 Id. at 24 (citation omitted) (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230
(1979), which had quoted Roth, 354 U.S. at 489).
32 Although the Miller standard appears to be tailored towards hard-core materi-
als, it ultimately relies upon the application of local community standards. See Miller,
413 U.S. at 30-34. This reliance on community standards can be seen as a conservative
element of the definition, tending to restrict the availability of materials, although it
also has been argued that a national standard would have inhibitory effects. See id. at
32 n.13.
11 See F. SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 69-95.
34 Id. at 27-28, 105-09.
a1 Id. at 102-05.
SB Id. at 136-53.
" Kaplan, Obscenity as an Esthetic Category, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 544
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place aesthetic judgments beyond the scope of the judiciary's proper
role in the determination of first amendment issues.3 Yet, there is little
doubt that judges consciously make such judgments in the realm of ob-
scenity law. 9
Many commentators believe that obscene works should not be ex-
cluded from first amendment protection.40 Some believe that the first
amendment protects expressive nonverbal conduct as well as verbal
speech. 4' Others argue that even hard-core pornography has sufficient
cognitive content to be considered speech within the meaning of the first
amendment.42 Underlying all of these objections is the notion that ob-
(1955), provides a discussion of aesthetic considerations of obscenity. Kaplan argues
that pornography cannot really be subjected to an aesthetic analysis because such anal-
ysis requires "distance," and pornography is "not itself the object of an experience,...
but rather a stimulus to an experience." Id. at 548. But see S. SONTAG, The Porno-
graphic Imagination, in STYLES OF RADICAL WILL 35, 38-48 (1969) (arguing that
literary pornographic works do exist but critics' view of literature by definition ex-
cludes pornography).
11 See, e.g., Schauer, Speech, supra note 29, at 927. See also A Book Named
"John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S.
413, 427 (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("We are judges, not literary experts.");
Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 96-97 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that state suppression should be limited to materials utterly lacking in social
value).
" Indeed, Miller states that the trier of fact should consider "whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." See
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. See also, New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762 (1982) ("We
consider it unlikely that visual depictions of children performing sexual acts would
often constitute an important and necessary part of a literary performance . . . ."); A
Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General,
338 U.S. 413, 450 (1966) (Clark, J., dissenting) (finding Fanny Hill to be "utterly
without redeeming social importance"); Roth, 354 U.S. at 498 (1957) (Harlan, J., con-
curring in part) (obscenity judgments involve judicial evaluation of the works in
question).
0 Most commentators seem to accept a broad enough conception of first amend-
ment values to encompass protection for obscenity. See, e.g., Richards, Free Speech and
Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
45, 73, 91 (1974).
41 Professor Baker is perhaps clearest in advocating first amendment protection for
a "broad realm of nonviolent, noncoercive activity." Baker, Scope of the First Amend-
ment, supra note 18, at 990. See also Feinberg, Pornography and the Criminal Law,
40 U. PrrT. L. REV. 567, 576 (1979) (arguing that regulation of expressive conduct
may contravene first amendment guarantees).
4' See Richards, supra note 40, at 81 (pornography advocates "pornotopia"-a
vision of society and social relationships); Gerety, Pornography and Violence, 40 U.
PITT. L. REV. 627, 649-51 (1979) (supporting obscenity regulation but advocating por-
nographic works that "agitat[e] for social, political, economic, cultural or artistic
change.") But see supra note 29 (outlining arguments against protecting pornography).
Ironically, the feminist analysis of pornography gives it a claim to cognitive content and
even to status as political speech. See, e.g., S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL:
MEN WOMEN AND RAPE 443 (1975) ("Pornography is the undiluted essence of anti-
female propaganda."). Some pornographers view themselves as advancing a form of
"porn liberation." See, e.g., Schipper, Filthy Lucre: A Tour of America's Most Profita-
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scenity law's two-tier approach, which distinguishes valued or protected
speech from worthless or unprotected speech,4" is inconsistent with the
principle that government should refrain from evaluating speech."
B. Conservative and Liberal Approaches to Pornography
Liberal and conservative positions on pornography can be distin-
guished by their responses to three issues.4" The first issue is the nature
and meaning of sex. The second is the function of sexual imagery, and
the third is the proper role of law in the regulation of sexually-oriented
materials.
Characterization of the conservative position on pornography be-
gins with its reliance on a traditional view of sexuality.46 In this view
sex is legitimate, proper, and moral only within marriage and, even
then, only for the purpose of procreation.4 7 This account of sexuality
derives from a fundamentally religious strand of Western culture that
generally denigrates the corporeal in favor of the spiritual4 8 and that
until recently strongly influenced social mores. Current mores perhaps
embody less extreme versions of this account, but the notion that sex is
somehow wrong, dirty, or sinful unless it is redeemed by some legiti-
mating circumstance like marriage or love remains a force in our cul-
ble Frontier, MOTHER JONES, April 1980, at 31, 60.
"' The two-tier terminology was first used by Kalven. See Schauer, supra note 32,
at 899 n.3 (citing Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT.
REV. 1, 10). However, the analysis itself can be seen in Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-73 (1942) ("fighting words"), and Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250, 255-58 (1950) (group libel).
" See, e.g., Richards, supra, note 40, at 79-80.
Although it is clearly an oversimplification to define only two positions on the
issue of pornography, this simplification imposes some order on an otherwise bewilder-
ing array of opinions. For the purposes of this Comment, the simplification is not mis-
leading; most of the nonfeminist analyses fall within the parameters of the conservative
and liberal positions here delineated.
For examples of the conservative and liberal positions and the contrast between
them, see UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, REPORT
OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY (1970)
(liberal) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT]. Compare id. at 379 (statements of
Morris A. Lipton and Edward B. Greenwood) (liberal) with id. at 383 (statements of
Morton A. Hill and Winfrey C. Link) (conservative). For a more vitriolic statement of
the conservative position, see id. at 511 (statement of Charles E. Keating, Jr.).
" See, e.g., L. ZURCHER & R. KIRKPATRICK, CITIZENS FOR DECENCY 113
(1976); Berns, Beyond the (Garbage) Pale or Democracy, Censorship and the Arts, in
CENSORSHIP AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 49, 58-59 (H. Clor ed. 1971); Christen-
son, It's Time to Excise the Pornographic Cancer, 25 CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Jan. 2,
1981, at 20, 22.
47 For a description of the traditional view, see Introduction, PHILOSOPHY AND
SEX 1-7 (R. Baker & F. Elliston eds. 1975).
48 Id.
[Vol. 133:497
FEMINISM, PORNOGRAPHY, AND LAW
ture. This notion is part of a larger conservative emphasis on virtue,
self-control, and dignity as the basic elements of a moral and social
perspective. 9
In the conservative view, images of sex are inevitably isolated from
the context of love, commitment, and decency that legitimate sexuality.
Thus the tendency of such images is to arouse a nonspecific desire for
sex rather than a desire for sexual interaction with a specific person
and to degrade a private activity by making it public.50 The conse-
quence of allowing sexually arousing images to become a part of public
life is the corruption of community values. Ultimately, virtue is sacri-
ficed, and the quality of social life declines.5"
The scope of the conservative view may sweep beyond what is nor-
mally thought of as pornography. With respect to literature and other
media, the conservative critique may extend to materials that use strong
language or approve of indecent activities. Conservative opposition to
pornography may be politically related to the opposition to sex educa-
tion, birth control, civil rights for homosexuals, or abortion. The unify-
ing theme is virtue expressed in terms of sexual restraint and mainte-
nance of the family as an institution.
52
Finally, the conservative perspective is generally sympathetic to
the use of law, as an expression of collective morality, to reflect and
enforce fundamental values.5 In the conservative view the law is a
49 See L. ZURCHER & R. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 46, at 20-23; Berns, supra
note 46, at 60-62; Kristol, Pornography, Obscenity and the Case for Censorship, in
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 165, 169-70 (J. Feinberg & H. Gross eds. 1975). See generally
T. WILLIAMS, SEE No EVIL: CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD SEX IN ART AND EN-
TERTAINMENT (1976) (discussing popular arguments against pornography usually in-
voke the necessity for decency and virtue in the face of licentiousness, vice, and
corruption).
50 Berns, supra note 46, at 58; Clor, Obscenity and Freedom of Expression, in
CENSORSHIP AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 46, at 97, 102-05; Williams,
Offensiveness, Pornography, and Art, in PORNOGRAPHY AND CENSORSHIP 185, 188-
89 (D. Copp & S. Wendell eds. 1983) ("Pornography crosses the line between private
and public. .. ").
" See Berns, supra note 46, at 63-69; Kristol, supra note 49, at 169-70; Wil-
liams, supra note 50, at 189-90; see also Bickel, On Pornography II: Dissenting and
Concurring Opinions, 22 THE PUB. INTEREST 25, 25-26 (Winter 1971), quoted in
Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 59 n.9 (1973); Smut, Pornography,
Obscenity-Signs the Tide is Turning, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 7, 1973, at
39-44.
52 It would be very important, in other contexts, to distinguish among conserva-
tives adopting stronger or weaker versions of the sexual philosophy described in the
text. Some would limit their opposition to a narrowly confined class of materials
whereas others would oppose a broader class. See, e.g., Christenson, supra note 46, at
20-21.
11 See, e.g., P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965). Empirical stud-
ies have found a significant correlation between approval of strong law enforcement
procedures and disapproval of pornography. See, e.g., Birkelbach & Zurcher, Some
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means of protecting social decency and the quality of life. Conservatives
would conclude that pornography is not something that ought to be
protected by the first amendment because it depraves and corrupts its
audience, indirectly causes widespread social decay, and particularly
harms the family.
In contrast the liberal view tolerates, and sometimes even approves
of, a wide variety of sexual activity. The desire to have sex is seen as
healthy rather than as shameful or sinful. Liberals thus argue that the
only legitimate restraint on sexual activity is the informed consent of
the participants; 4 any further restriction is an exercise in moralism and
paternalism. In fact liberals argue that the very constraints approved by
conservatives are the cause of the "perversions" that conservatives
condemn.55
For the liberal, images of sex may serve a variety of important
social functions, but they reveal an individual's fundamental taste.56
The fact that a variety of legitimate tastes exist is confirmed by the
existence of a market for a variety of sexually-oriented materials.
57
Thus, although some liberals may believe that some sexually-oriented
materials are disgusting and offensive, the problem is seen as an issue
of taste, not morality.
Once this conclusion is reached, it seems illegitimate to prefer one
Socio-Political Characteristics of Anti-Pornography Campaigners, 4 Soc. SYMP. 13,
13-22 (1970); Peek & Brown, Pornography as a Political Symbol: Attitudes Toward
Commercial Nudity and Attitudes Toward Political Organizations, 58 Soc. Sci. Q.
717, 717-23 (1978).
5" See, e.g., Baumrin, Sexual Immorality Delineated, in PHILOSOPHY AND SEX,
supra note 48, at 116, 119-20; Elliston, In Defense of Promiscuity, in id. at 222, 232-
240.
55 These views are primarily attributable to the influence of Freud and psychoa-
nalysis. See, e.g., Freud, The Sexual Life of Human Beings, in INTRODUCTORY LEC-
TURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS 303, 310 (J. Strachey ed. 1966); see also Gaylin, Obscen-
ity is More than a Four-Letter Word, in CENSORSHIP AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION,
supra note 46, at 153, 160-62.
5' See, e.g., Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 491 (1966) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); see also Feinberg, Pornography and the Criminal Law, 40 U. PiTT. L.
REV. 567, 568 (1979) (arguing that although pornography may be offensive, it is not
harmful). But cf. Clark, Liberalism and Pornography, in PORNOGRAPHY AND CEN-
SORSHIP, supra note 50, at 45, 51-58 (arguing for reconceptualization of what is
"harmful"); Gerety, Pornography and Violence, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 627, 632-34,
652-60 (1979) (insisting that violent pornography is harmful, even to "bystanders").
57 See, e.g., Baier, Response: The Liberal Approach to Pornography, 40 U. PiTT.
L. REV. 619, 624-25 (1979) (arguing that obscenity is protected by the first amend-
ment, which "guarantees the freedom to express, advocate, extol, and defend alternative
ideals and standards of purity"). This does not necessarily mean that all liberals ap-
prove of any and all sexually-oriented materials or of their unrestricted distribution.
See, e.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 45 at 51-60 (Although the Commission
recommended the abolition of obscenity laws, it approved restrictions on young persons'
access to sexually explicit materials.).
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set of tastes to another. It then follows that pornography, however de-
fined, should be protected by the first amendment. 8 Thus, just as liber-
als argue that the law should not restrain the sexual activities of con-
senting adults, they also argue that the law should protect consenting
adults who produce and consume sexually-oriented materials. 59
C. Conservative and Liberal Elements in Obscenity Law
Obscenity law is fundamentally conservative, but its details re-
present a compromise with liberalism. This conservatism is primarily
evident in the denial of first amendment protection to obscenity. The
Supreme Court has premised its obscenity holdings on its concern for
maintaining public decency and avoiding obscenity's perceived harms.6"
Despite its conservative premises, the Court has made concessions to
liberalism by employing a relatively narrow definition of obscenity.61
This definition nonetheless embodies conservative assumptions. The
conservative bias is evident in the Court's concern with "prurience,"
which, despite some attempts to limit its meaning, 2 seems to refer sim-
ply to a work's intent to produce sexual arousal.6 3 Use of the capacity
for sexual arousal as the main test for obscenity expresses the conserva-
tives' basic disapproval of sex. The Court's requirement that a work
have some serious value further amplifies this bias. This requirement
58 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 40-41 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (obscenity involves ques-
tions of taste). "Neutrality" is central to many versions of liberalism. See B. ACKER-
MAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10-12 (1980) (authority cannot be vin-
dicated by reference to "a privileged insight into the moral universe"); Feinberg, supra
note 56, at 568 (liberalism permits regulation only for the purpose of preventing harm
or nuisance to others); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959). The feminist argument takes issue with the liberal stance
of neutrality. See infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
" This does not mean that pornography may not be regulated to avoid unneces-
sary offense or exposure of children but that regulation would have to meet the familiar
time, place, and manneC constraints of the first amendment. Consistent with its toler-
ance of the activities of consenting adults, the COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 45, at
51-56, recommends the abolition of all obscenity laws but would restrict the access of
"explicit sexual materials to young persons," id. at 66. See also id. at 56-60. In the
same vein, the report sanctions restrictions on the public display and unsolicited mail-
ing of explicit materials. See id. at 60-62. Liberal concerns for the protection of unwill-
ing audiences are considered by Feinberg, supra note 56, at 567-72, and Scanlon, Free-
dom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. PITT. L. REv. 519, 542-50
(1979).
0 See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973).
61 See supra text accompanying notes 33-36.
02 See, e.g., Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 n.20; F. SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 96-102.
e For a pre-Roth defense of this element of the definition, see F. SCHAUER, supra
note 3, at 98; see also Gardiner, Moral Principles Toward a Definition of the Obscene,
20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 560, 562-71 (1955).
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implies that a work that produces sexual arousal can be redeemed64 if
it, as a whole, contains some serious value that encourages the reader's
detachment from any sexual response. Finally, the "patently offensive"
requirement seems to presume a set of shared values that define clearly
what should offend any decent person.
The legal standards distinguishing the obscene from the nonob-
scene therefore reflect a conservative bias by preferring the tastes of
those who are offended by sexually-arousing materials to the tastes of
those who enjoy them. In contrast liberals would consider legitimate,
even socially important, a work having sexual arousal as its primary
purpose.65 A distinction may be drawn between works that serve this
purpose well or badly, but erotica itself is not inherently suspect. Thus,
evaluating these works is a job for cultural critics, not judges.
The specific elements of the Court's definition of obscenity, and
the concerns underlying them, -have long been the object of a liberal
attack. 6 With respect to the Court's worries about corruption, liberals
emphasize the right of citizens in a free society to corrupt themselves.
They also emphasize the inappropriateness of any government efforts
to define corruption in the area of consensual sexual relations.6 7 Ex-
panding on these arguments, liberals submit that pornography is pro-
duced, distributed, and consumed by willing participants, none of
whom feel harmed. Liberals further believe that there is little evidence
that pornography causes any actual harm.' In their view pornography
" The phrase "utterly without redeeming social importance" was first used in
Roth. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 484. It was relied upon most directly in A Book Named
"John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S.
413, 418-21 (1966); see also Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). Miller re-
placed the test with a formulation exempting works without "serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value" from first amendment protection. See Miller, 413 U.S. at
24-25.
'5 See, e.g., E. KRONHAUSEN & P. KRONHAUSEN, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW
(1959); S. SONTAG, The Pornographic Imagination, in STYLES OF RADICAL WILL 38-
48 (1969); Richards, supra note 40, at 79-80.
" The liberal attack on the Court's position has been mounted perhaps most au-
thoritatively by the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography. See COMMISSION RE-
PORT, supra note 45; UNITED STATES COMM'N ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY,
TECHNICAL REPORTS OF THE COMM'N ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY (1971)
(five volumes of empirical research) [hereinafter cited as TECHNICAL REPORTS].
"' Liberal responses to the Court's concerns are traceable to John Stuart Mill's
philosophy granting the government authority to restrict individual freedoms only to
prevent harm to others. See J.S. MILL, supra note 18; Feinberg, supra note 56, at 567-
68; Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 213
(1972); Scanlon, supra note 59, at 528-37. Chief Justice Burger has explicitly rejected
Mill's principle. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63-69 (1973).
" This is the most often cited conclusion of the COMMISSION REPORT, supra note-
45, at 27 ("The Commission cannot conclude that exposure to erotic materials is a
factor in the causation of sex crime or sex delinquency."). For a survey of empirical
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seems as likely to have beneficial as harmful effects given its educa-
tional, cathartic, and liberating functions.6 9 Liberals would put the bur-
den of proof upon those who would restrict the liberty of those who
desire to produce and consume sexually-oriented materials.70 Finally,
liberals argue that even if the Court believes pornography's participants
are being harmed, by sacrificing their dignity for money or by weaken-
ing the self-control required for virtuous citizenship, its decision to
"protect" the participants through obscenity regulation is plainly pater-
nalistic. 1 The liberal position therefore concludes that the most sound
course is to defend liberty against moralism and paternalism.
Liberal accusations of paternalism are met with conservative accu-
sations of anarchy and license.7 2 Conservatives defend the Court's un-
derlying moral position by arguing that liberty divorced from virtue is
not worthy of political commitment. Conservatives also dispute the em-
pirical issues, arguing that there is evidence showing pornography to be
harmful. 3 Although the evidence may be inconclusive, they point out
that while long-term and indirect effects are difficult to verify experi-
mentally. Yet, such effects may be crucial to the argument.7 4 Finally,
conservatives are incredulous that anyone could believe that sexually-
oriented materials have no effect. "If you believe that no one was ever
corrupted by a book," writes Irving Kristol, "you also have to believe
that no one was ever improved by a book . . . and that, consequently,
all education is morally irrelevant.1
76
Liberals and conservatives do agree on the parameters of their dis-
agreement. Both believe that people's varying reactions to sexually-ori-
research since the COMMISSION REPORT, see Daniels, The Supreme Court and Ob-
scenity: An Exercise in Empirical Constitutional Policy-Making, 17 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 757 (1980). See also infra note 97.
" Support for the liberal view that pornographic materials serve a cathartic func-
tion is usually drawn from the research performed for the Commission on Obscenity
and Pornography. See TECHNICAL REPORTS, supra note 66. For criticism of the liberal
view, see, for example, Clark, Liberalism and Pornography, in PORNOGRAPHY AND
CENSORSHIP, supra note 50, at 45, 56-58; Griffin, Sadism and Catharsis: The Treat-
ment is the Disease, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra
note 10, at 141.
70 See, e.g., Berger, Pornography, Sex, and Censorship, in PORNOGRAPHY AND
CENSORSHIP, supra note 50, at 83, 99.
7' See Dworkin, Paternalism, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 49, at 174-84
(discussing types of government interference that can be considered paternalistic).
72 See, e.g., Kristol, supra note 49, at 168-69.
q See L.V. SUNDERLAND, OBSCENITY: THE COURT, THE CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION 71-84 (1974); Hill-Link Minority Report, supra note 45, at
390-412.
"4 See L.V. SUNDERLAND, supra note 73, at 84; Hill-Link Minority Report,
supra note 45, at 390-412.
7" Kristol, supra note 49, at 165.
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ented material are informed by the observer's underlying philosophy of
sexuality. Liberals and conservatives also agree that the legal treatment
of sexually-oriented materials depends on aspects of social philosophy
as well as on empirical research into the effects of pornography. Be-
cause feminists question these assumptions, their views challenge the
comfortable dialogue that has determined the parameters of obscenity
law. The starting point for understanding the feminist challenge is an
examination of the feminist account of pornography.
II. THE FEMINIST ACCOUNT OF PORNOGRAPHY
Feminists"6 differ considerably from both conservatives and liberals
in their responses to all three of the issues delineating political positions
on pornography. These differences are largely attributable to the fact
that the focal point of the feminist view is neither virtue nor liberty but,
instead, equality. This different focus produces a crucial insight: only
from a male perspective, whether liberal or conservative, does pornog-
raphy seems to be primarily about sex. Feminists emphasize equality in
sexual relations and evaluate sexually-oriented materials in that light.
Pornography, so viewed, is not so much about sex as it is about
power. 7
This distinction between sex and power is complicated, however,
by the existence of issues of power throughout the realm of sexuality.
Sexuality has long been a means by which men have expressed and
"Z It should not be assumed that all feminists would agree on the importance of
pornography as a women's issue or on specific elements of the feminist account as it is
described here. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. There is, however, a signifi-
cant body of feminist literature that comprises a relatively unified account of pornogra-
phy; this work provides the basis for the feminist arguments presented in this Com-
ment. It should be further noted that this Comment assumes that feminists are
expressing the interests of women generally. Hence no distinction will be drawn be-
tween feminists' interests and women's interests. Needless to say, this is a controversial
assumption. See, e.g., B. EHRENREICH, THE HEARTS OF MEN: AMERICAN DREAMS
AND THE FLIGHT FROM COMMITMENT 144-68 (1983) (describing women's an-
tifeminist movements); Ehrenreich, The Women's Movements: Feminist and An-
tifeminist, 15 RADICAL AM. 93, 99-100 (1981) (same).
7 "The major theme of pornography as a genre is male power, its nature, its
magnitude, its use, its meaning." A. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 24. See Diamond,
Pornography and Repression: A Reconsideration of "Who" and "What," in TAKE
BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at 187-92 (arguing
that pornography expresses norms about male power and domination).
The feminist identification of pornography as a problem of power rather than
sexuality parallels feminists' identification of rape as a crime of violence rather than an
act of lust. See S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 42. This insight clarifies Robin Morgan's
assertion that pornography is the theory and rape the practice. See R. MORGAN, supra
note 16, at 163.
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exercised power over women."8 Historically, sexual repression has been
disproportionately enforced upon women, while male "sinfulness" and
"indiscretion" have been legally and socially tolerated.79 The feminist
commitment to sexual equality extends further than a simple desire for
expanded opportunities for women's sexual expression, however. Many
feminists sense that sexuality itself has been so distorted by male domi-
nance that women cannot participate equally unless eroticism is
redefined. 0
This emphasis on equality is an important aspect of feminist per-
ceptions of sexual images. Feminists distinguish between liberating,
egalitarian images and degrading images; images within the first cate-
gory are erotic, whereas images within the second category are porno-
graphic."' Pornography thus "objectifies, degrades and brutalizes a per-
son in the name of sexual stimulation or entertainment."8 2
Feminist suspicions that sexuality has been distorted by male dom-
inance are confirmed by their finding that the vast majority of sexually-
oriented materials produced in this society are pornographic rather
than erotic. 83 The sexual imagery of the pornography industry, an in-
78 See S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 42; Foa, What's Wrong With Rape, in FEM-
INISM AND PHILOSOPHY 347, 347-51 (M. Vetterling-Braggin, F. Elliston, & J. Eng-
lish eds. 1977); Peterson, Coercion and Rape: The State as a Male Protection Racket,
in id. at 360, 360-67.
79 The inequitable distribution of sexual repression is perhaps best seen in the
double standard that has long been applied to male and female sexual behavior. Be-
cause it is based on the notion that men's sexual drives are greater than women's, the
double standard creates the need for "bad" women with whom men can have sex. The
result is a distinction between "good" and "bad" women, for which the criterion is
sexual activity; this distinction is unique to women's struggles. See, e.g., D. DINNER-
STEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR 38-75 (1976); A. DWORKIN, supra note
10, at 203-209; S. GRIFFIN, supra note 10, at 20-24.
80 See S. HITE, THE HITE REPORT 304-57 (1976); E. Willis, Hard To Swallow:
"Deep Throat," in BEGINNING TO SEE THE LIGHT: PIECES OF A DECADE 68-70, 73-
75 (1981); Willis, Feminism, Moralism, and Pornography, in id. at 219.
Si See Steinem, Erotica and Pornography: A Clear and Present Difference, in
TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at 37-38; Tong,
Feminism, Pornography and Censorship, 8 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 1, 2-4 (1982) (dis-
tinguishing "erotica" from "thanatica"). But see A. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at pref-
ace (erotica is currently merely a subcategory of pornography); GRIFFIN, supra note
10, at 11 (speaking of "two social movements . . . [one] reclaiming [the] erotic life as a
part of human nature" and the other expressing fear and hatred of eros); cf. Willis,
supra note 13, at 222-23.
82 Women Against Pornography flyer (undated) (on file at University of Pennsyl-
vania Law Review).
83 This is clearly the assumption of most antipornography feminists, and thus it is
not surprising that they find it to be the case. The seeming circularity of the analysis
does not undermine its validity, however; rather, it reflects the interrelationship be-
tween pornography and sexuality. The distinction between egalitarian and degrading
sexual imagery is unique to feminist theory and has not often been used as a basis for
scientific experiment; it is therefore difficult to offer empirical support for the feminists'
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dustry in which men produce images of women for other men, 4 objecti-
fies and degrades women. It portrays them as requiring some coaxing,
after which they always become eager for sexual submission-even for
violence and torture. Pornography approves male domination of women
by portraying it as pleasurable both to men and women. Feminists ar-
gue that pornography thereby increases the probability and social ac-
ceptability of violence against, and exploitation of, women. Ultimately,
this pornographic ideology tends to make both men and women dis-
count women's perspective, interests, and will.
5
The effects of pornography can be understood only in light of the
history of gender inequality and exploitation. In general, women have
been excluded from culture and relegated to the private sphere of do-
mesticity from which they have been permitted to escape only on the
condition that they accept male-defined terms. Women's perspectives
have thus been systematically neglected, distorted, and undervalued.8
Hence, an insistence on the value of women's experience is the bedrock
of any feminist analysis.8 7 And sensitivity to male power and female
powerlessness is characteristic of a developed feminist perspective.88
conclusions that most of what is produced by the pornography industry is degrading to
women. At the very least, studies have indicated that a substantial share of pornogra-
phy depicts violence against women, necessarily involving domination of them. See in-
fra note 114 and accompanying text.
84 The exception-gay male pornography-is produced by men for men. These
materials account for approximately 10% of the adult book market and a similar per-
centage of the film market. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 45, at 15-17. For infor-
mation on the business of pornography, see id. at 73-137; Schipper, supra note 42, at
31; Smith, All-American Sex, Phila. Inquirer, Jan. 15, 1984 (Magazine), at 17.
88 See, e.g., S. GRIFFIN, supra note 10, at 89-93; cf. Lederer, Then and Now: An
Interview With A Former Pornography Model, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN
ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at 57 (pornography industry ignores the interests
and personhood of models); Russell, Pornography and Violence: What Does the New
Research Say?, in id. at 220-21 (discussing pornographic article purporting to substan-
tiate the notion that women enjoy rape). The argument that pornography is related to
the discounting of women's interests is reinforced by the feminist account of liberals'
refusal to acknowledge the oppressive aspects of the pornographer's liberty. See infra
note 186-87 and accompanying text.
88 See, e.g., S. GRIFFIN, supra note 10, at 243-49; Markovic, Women's Liberation
and Human Emancipation, in WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY 145, 154-64 (C. Gould &
M. Wartofsky eds. 1976); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 955, 967-69 (1984).
87 Although there may be widespread endorsement of the abstract principle that
men and women are equal, this is a far cry from actually accepting women's experience
to be as equally valuable as men's experience. See D. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 79; W.
FARRELL, THE LIBERATED MAN: BEYOND MASCULINITY 256-57 (1974) (discussing
housework of male consciousness-raising group); Frye, Male Chauvinisim: A Concep-
tual Analysis, in PHILOSOPHY AND SEX, supra note 48, at 65.
88 This does not mean that male power is the only element in the feminist per-
spective of power. In the process of feminist consciousness-raising, awareness of
women's victimization is a prelude to empowerment. See Bartky, Toward a Phenome-
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These principles suggest that the feminist attempt to define an aes-
thetic that does not suffer from the one-sidedness of the dominant male
view requires the articulation of women's experience of pornography.89
However, taking such a perspective on pornography would mean feel-
ing oneself imaginatively to be the women portrayed by a medium that
"begins by annihilating the real female self and replacing this self with
a false self." 90 This annihilation is achieved both by the very existence
of pornography and by its actual content.
In form, pornography is the marketing of images of women by
men for men. This objectifies women; they are manipulated and are
thereby robbed of their subjectivity and their capacity to define reality
in their own terms.9" This formal characterization is reinforced by the
anonymity of pornography,92 its emphasis on parts of the women's
body, 3 its thematic focus on fetishism,94 and its general lack of feeling.95
nology of Feminist Consciousness, in FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 78, at
22, 27; see also MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda
for Theory, 7 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & Soc. 515, 535-44 (1982) ("Conscious-
ness-raising is [feminism's] quintessential expression.").
89 As a matter of empirical fact, however, men and women appear to differ in
their responses to pornography. This difference is only partly explicable in terms of
differences in the amount of exposure men and women have had to pornography. See,
e.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 45, at 163-215; H. EYSENCK & D. NIAS, SEX,
VIOLENCE AND THE MEDIA 221-25 (1978). But see Fisher & Byrne, Sex Differences
in Response to Erotica?, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 117, 123-24 (1978)
(suggesting that men and women respond similarly but that women perceived movies to
be more pornographic than did men).
In the feminist perspective, measured responses to pornography are not central to
an evaluation of pornography because responses may be influenced by socialized moral
and sexual attitudes. This does not mean that empirical research is irrelevant but that
its results must be weighed in light of the forces that may shape responses. Thus the
crucial question is how pornography would be viewed by a developed feminist
consciousness.
1o S. GRIFFIN, supra note 10, at 217. See also id. at 204-17. Examination of
pornography with a feminist consciousness is exemplified by Dworkin's analysis of in-
dividual pornographic works. See A. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 27-30 (describing
photograph in which a woman is tied naked to the roof of a car, as if she had been
hunted); id. at 138-43 (describing Playboy photographs of a woman bound to a pole
and held stationary by lasers; the accompanying text calls her a "volunteer").
The effect of this analysis upon the consciousness of the observer is described by
Dworkin: "If a woman has any sense of her own intrinsic worth, seeing pornography
in small bits and pieces can bring her to a useful rage. Studying pornography in quan-
tity and depth . . . will turn that same woman into a mourner." Dworkin, Pornogra-
phy and Grief, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note
10, at 286.
91 See, e.g., A. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 101-28; S. GRIFFIN, supra note 10, at
36-46.
2 This anonymity is part of what makes it plausible to see pornography as being
about women per se.
93 See, e.g., Ordinance Amending Title 7 of Minneapolis Code of Ordinances Re-
lating to Civil Rights § 3 (Dec. 30, 1983) (vetoed Jan. 5, 1984).
" See A. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 123-27.
95 See S. GRIFFIN, supra note 10, at 56-59.
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The subjectivity that women do express in pornographic images is
predominantly one of pleasure in being objectified. Women are por-
trayed as desiring fulfillment by serving as an object that perfectly in-
spires, responds to, and fulfills male sexual desires.96 Pornography's
most brutal forms portray women as enjoying being beaten, raped,
bound, or otherwise abused.
9 7
Women do resist in pornography, but their resistance is of two
basic stereotyped kinds. First, there is false, moralistic resistance. Once
this resistance is overcome, whether by force or seduction, the woman
often adopts a nymphomaniacal attitude.9" Second, there is more serious
" See, e.g., A. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 115, 129-32. The perpetuation of this
view of women's sexual fulfillment is a basis of feminists' objections to even the
"milder" pornographic publications.
" There is some disagreement about how much of pornography is violent. Few
studies have focused on quantifying the amount of violence in pornography. One study
examined 428 adult books easily accessible to the general public and found that in
approximately one-third of the sex episodes force was used to obtain women's partici-
pation. See Smith, The Social Content of Pornography, 26 J. CoM., 16 (1976). An-
other studied cartoons and pictures in Playboy and Penthouse magazines from 1973 to
1977. It found a "clear and consistent" increase in violence with respect to pictorials
over the five-year period. Overall, ten percent of the cartoons and five percent of the
pictures appearing in 1977 were considered violent. Malamuth & Spinner, A Longitu-
dinal Content Analysis of Sexual Violence in the Best-Selling Erotic Magazines, 16 J.
SEX RESEARCH 226 (1980). This low figure is not surprising given that the two
magazines chosen are among the mildest forms of pornography available.
A consistent flaw in the numerous experiments designeid to test the sociological and
psychological effects of pornography is the lack of control over the content of films used
in experiments. See, e.g., Sapolsky & Zillmann, The Effect of Soft-Core and Hard-
Core Erotica on Provoked and Unprovoked Hostile Behavior, 17 J. SEX RESEARCH
319 (1981) (criticizing lack of content control in prior pornography research). A dis-
tinction between hard-core and soft-core pornography usually is maintained, but the
effect of such factors as violence, coercion of women, and mutuality of desire among
participants is rarely isolated or controlled. Id. For discussions of other biases and
flaws in pornography studies, see generally Bart & Jozsa, Dirty Books, Dirty Films,
and Dirty Data, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note
10, at 204; Copp, Introductory Essay, in PORNOGRAPHY AND CENSORSHIP, supra note
50, at 15, 34-38; Diamond, Pornography and Repression: A Reconsideration of
"Who" and "What," in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra
note 10, at 187-203; McCormack, Machismo in Media Research: A Critical Review of
Research on Violence and Pornography, 25 Soc. PROBS. 544 (1978); Russell, Pornog-
raphy and Violence: What Does the New Research Say?, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT:
WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at 218-39. For a critique of the use of
social science research to determine public policy, see, for example, Wilson, Violence,
Pornography and Social Science, in THE PORNOGRAPHY CONTROVERSY 225 (R. Rist
ed. 1975).
98 See, e.g., E. KRONHAUSEN & P. KRONHAUSEN, supra note 65, at 195-200.
Although the authors do not emphasize the points that feminists do-the book was
written in 1959-their analysis can provide support for feminist arguments. Compare
id. at 203-06 (discussing the rape of virgins) with S. GRIFFIN, supra note 10, at 20-24
(discussing male power through money and sex) and S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 42,
at 389-404 (discussing characteristics of rapists and rape victims). The false moralism
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resistance generated by a desire for independence or control. This resis-
tance tends to mark the woman as a "bitch," "feminist," or "lesbian";
in any case, she is not a "real woman." Her fate is often grisly. 9
Once women's experience is taken seriously, pornography appears
as neither perversion nor entertainment, but as a genre expressing
threats and hostility aimed at the maintenance of male power over
women. It portrays for men the pleasures of power and the dangers of
losing control; it reveals to women the dangers of any attempt indepen-
dently to explore their own sexuality. 100
The pornography industry, rather than simply catering to a tiny
minority of our soci ety, sells a product that is widely desired and so-
cially significant. The industry is larger than the legitimate film and
record industries combined, and the combined circulation of Playboy
and Penthouse exceeds that of Time and Newsweek."' Assuming that
the feminist account of pornography is correct and recognizing that
theme in pornography is often explicitly antireligious, even sacrilegious. See, e.g., S.
GRIFFIN, supra note 10, at 69-80; E. KRONHAUSEN & P. KRONHAUSEN, supra note
65, at 216-19. This tendency allies pornographers with one dimension of liberalism.
11 See A. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 30-36. When the "feminist" emerges victo-
rious, Dworkin argues, the outcome stands as a clear reminder to male readers that it is
very dangerous to let women out of their control. The growth of this theme in recent
years, together with the general increase in explicit violence in pornography, is taken
by feminists to be part of a backlash against feminism. See, e.g., Russell & Lederer,
Questions We Get Asked Most Often, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON POR-
NOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at 27-28.
10 Pornography, as a product of the male imagination, may be analyzed by draw-
ing on psychoanalytic sources. Some feminists, who have so examined pornography,
conclude that it betrays a deep fear of women's power, particularly of women's sexual
power. Its basis lies in resentment against the mother, generalized to all women, and
layered over with a socialization to the prerogatives of masculinity. This fear is ex-
pressed in a desperate need to control women's sexuality and in anger against any hint
of genuine independence. See, e.g., A. DWORKIN, supra note 10; S. GRIFFIN, supra
note 10; Chesler, Men and Pornography: Why They Use It, in TAKE BACK THE
NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at 155; Lurie; Pornography and
the Dread of Women, in id. at 159; see also N. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF
MOTHERING (1978); D. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 79, 91-114.
101 Average circulation per issue for the last six months of 1982 totalled 7,556,206
for Time and Newsweek; 8,873,397 for Playboy and Penthouse. IMS, IMS '83 AYER
DIRECTORY OF PUBLICATIONS, at 1130, 1133 (1983). Sales of records, tapes, and legit-
imate movie box office receipts totalled $6,596,000,000 in 1981. Leisure Time: Basic
Analysis, 150 STANDARD & POOR'S INDUS. SURV. §§ 2, L22, L31 (Sept. 16, 1982).
Estimates of the sales volume of legal pornography vary considerably. The recent de-
mand for pornographic home video cassettes alone has increased sales by several billion
dollars. It is estimated that half of all video cassettes sold are pornographic. Serrin, Sex
Is A Growing Multibillion Dollar Business, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1981, at B6, col. 2.
The New York Times estimated that total pornography sales in 1980 were
$5,000,000,000, primarily generated by over 20,000 adult bookstores around the coun-
try. See id. at col 1. More recent estimates put the total volume at $10,000,000,000 for
1983. See Smith, All-American Sex, Phila. Inquirer, Jan. 15, 1984 (Magazine), at 18,
col. 1. See generally Schipper, supra note 42.
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pornography has a wide audience, we are led to conclude that pornog-
raphy is an integral part of an ideological system that advocates and
legitimates male domination of women. In both instrumental and sym-
bolic ways, feminists argue, pornography affirms male sexual rights
over women and female sexual duties (sometimes disguised as rights or
desires) to men. Feminists therefore conclude that pornography should
be regulated because it violates women's rights to equality.
This focus on equality differentiates feminists from conservatives,
who focus on virtue. Feminists charge that pornography helps to stabi-
lize the male-dominated social order, whereas conservatives charge that
it corrupts the citizenry and thereby destabilizes social order.10 2 The
feminists' connection of pornography with equality places the problem
in a context of changeable social circumstances and thereby leaves open
the possibility of nonpornographic erotic materials.10 3 Conservatives
base their opposition on principles they assume to be common to all
decent societies, thus placing pornography in a context of an unchange-
able, order of virtues that does not allow for any possibility of
nonpornographic erotic materials.
Although feminist and liberal positions on the issue of regulation
tend to differ, their overall differences are fewer and more subtle than
those between feminists and conservatives. Historically, feminism has
been connected with liberal or progressive movements, 0 and feminists
and liberals are often allies in other causes.1 5 The compatibility be-
tween liberals and feminists breaks down, however, with liberals' will-
ingness to subordinate women's sexual equality to the pornographer's
individual liberty. Feminists-particularly radical feminists-perceive
this difference as evidence of a profound male bias or insensitivity in
liberalism.'
... To the extent that the social order defended by conservatives is male-domi-
nated, these two views are direct opposites. Feminists view pornography as defending
traditional values, see, e.g., S. GRIFFIN, supra note 10, at 1-35, whereas conservatives
view it as undermining them, see, e.g., Berns, Beyond the (Garbage) Pale, or Democ-
racy, Censorship and the Arts, in THE PORNOGRAPHY CONTROVERSY, supra note 97,
at 40.
103 See, e.g., B. FAUST, supra note 13, at 21-24, 189-94; Garry, Pornography and
Respect for Women, 4 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 395, 413-16 (1978).
104 See, e.g., S. EVANS, PERSONAL POLITICS (1980); J. FREEMAN, THE POLITICS
OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION (1975).
105 See Clark, Liberalism and Pornography, in PORNOGRAPHY AND CENSORSHIP,
supra note 50, at 45 ("Since at least the mid-nineteenth century, the fight for women's
rights has largely been fought under the banner of liberalism."). But see id., at 45, 46-
52 (liberal emphasis on negative liberties is inconsistent with aspects of women's equal-
ity). See generally L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION (1973).
108 See, e.g., S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 42, at 438, 441-45; A. DWORKIN,
supra note 10, at 207-09; Clark, Liberalism and Pornography, in PORNOGRAPHY AND
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This bias may reflect a fundamental difference between female
and male moral frameworks, such as that suggested by Carol Gilli-
gan."' Gilligan characterizes the moral framework of women in terms
of care and responsibility rather than in terms of rights and rules. This
suggests that a feminist moral evaluation of pornography will empha-
size the kind of community it helps to create. In contrast, a male evalu-
ation of pornography, whether conservative or liberal, will tend to em-
phasize abstract principles.1l 8
III. FEMINIST APPROACHES TO THE LEGAL REGULATION OF
PORNOGRAPHY
A. Arguments in Support of Regulation
Feminist arguments posit three interests in the regulation of por-
nography. First, women participate in the pornography industry itself,
primarily as models and performers. By some criteria, their participa-
tion is voluntary. 09 Yet, strong social forces such as poverty, responsi-
bility for childcare, and a general socialization to "femininity," may
well motivate women's participation, and the presence of these forces
suggests that the participation of women is less voluntary than may
first appear. Considering these forces together with the personal and
commercial exploitation common in the pornography industry, it seems
CENSORSHIP, supra note 50.
17 See C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982). Gilligan's work is in part a response to Lawrence
Kohlberg's theory of moral development, see id. at 18-23; it is also responsive to a long
tradition in psychology and social theory that views women as morally inferior to men.
See, e.g., Freud, Femininity, in NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALY-
sis, 112, 134 (1965) ("The fact that women must be regarded as having little sense of
justice is no doubt related to the predominance of envy in their mental life .... ");
Weisstein, Psychology Constructs the Female, in RADICAL FEMINISM 178 (A. Koedt, E.
Levine & A. Rapone ed. 1973); see also S. OKIN, WOMEN IN WESTERN SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL THOUGHT (1980); Gould, The Woman Question: Philosophy of Liberation
and the Liberation of Philosophy, in WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 86, at 5.
108 See C. GILLIGAN, supra note 107, at 19 ("This [female] conception of morality
. . . centers moral development around the understanding of responsibility and rela-
tionships, just as the [male] conception of morality . . . ties moral development to the
understanding of rights and rules.")
Although many conservative arguments on pornography refer to its impact on the
community, the feminist position relies on a different conception of community. Con-
servatives tend to rely on abstract principles about community, for example ideas about
a priori structures such as male dominance. See B. EHRENREICH, supra note 80, at
180-82; C. GILLIGAN, supra note 107, at 173-74.
10. Pornographer Robert Guccione believes that women have an exhibitionistic
drive that is satisfied by appearing in pornographic works. See Polman, Guccione, Phil-
adelphia Inquirer, Oct. 9, 1984, at 4-E, cols. 1-3 ("[V]ery few women won't take their
clothes off. They luuuhv doing it . . ").
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reasonable to view women as harmed by their participation in the pro-
duction of pornography." ° At the least it would seem necessary to guar-
antee better wages, working conditions, and job security; more ambi-
tiously, it seems important to eliminate the social and economic forces
that motivate women to participate in pornography."'
Second, pornography indirectly functions as an influential form of
propaganda vividly advocating male domination of women." 2 This
propaganda is all the more effective because its ideological nature is
generally denied; the popular view that pornography is primarily about
sex rather than power conceals its male supremacist ideology and pro-
vides a basis for its social acceptance. In this respect pornography dif-
fers from explicit racist, or even sexist, propaganda, which is more
likely to be viewed as socially unacceptable." 3 This propaganda works
to shape and maintain attitudes and behaviors that stabilize structures
of male domination and increase the likelihood that society will tolerate
violence against women."'
110 See K. BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY (1979). For an insight into the lives
of pornography models, see L. LOVELACE, ORDEAL (1980); Lederer, Then and Now:
An Interview with a Former Pornography Model, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT:
WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at 57; Weene, Venus, HERESIES: A FEMI-
NIST PUBLICATION ON ART & POLITICS #12, 1981, at 36 (Sex Issue); Schipper, supra
note 42, at 32-33.
The Minneapolis ordinance creates a cause of action against producers, sellers,
exhibitors, and distributors for "any person who is coerced . . . into performing for
pornography." Ordinance Amending Title 7 of Minneapolis Code of Ordinances Relat-
ing to Civil Rights, § 4 (Dec. 30, 1983) (vetoed Jan. 5, 1984) The Ordinance makes it
extremely difficult to negate a finding of coercion. See id. § 4(m).
... This analysis parallels the feminist treatment of prostitution. See K. BARRY,
supra note 110; Millett, Prostitution: A Quartet for Female Voices, in WOMEN IN
SEXIST SOCIETY 60 (V. Gornick & B. Moran eds. 1971); see also, Ericsson, Charges
Against Prostitution: An Attempt at a Philosophical Assessment, 90 ETHICS 335, 348-
55 (1980) (arguing that attitudes against prostitution ought to be abandoned or modi-
fied because they are damaging and are based on beliefs prejudiced against women);
Wendell, Pornography and Freedom of Expression, in PORNOGRAPHY AND CENSOR-
SHIP, supra note 50, at 167 (assessing the extent to which coercion in production can
justify regulation).
112 See LaBelle, The Propaganda of Mysogyny, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT:
WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at 174.
113 See S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 42, at 442-45.
114 See id. at 395-96; Morgan, Theory and Practice: Pornography and Rape, in
TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at 134. Some
feminists have incorporated empirical findings into their formulations of this argument.
See, e.g., Bart & Jozsa, Dirty Books, Dirty Films, and Dirty Data, in TAKE BACK THE
NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at 204; Diamond, Pornography
and Repression, in id., at 187; Russell, Pornography and Violence: What Does the
New Research Say?, in id., at 218; see also McCormack, supra note 97. For empirical
studies regarding this issue, see Donnerstein, Pornography and Violence Against
Women: Experimental Studies, in PORNOGRAPHY AND CENSORSHIP supra note 50, at
219; Donnerstein & Berkowitz, Victim Reactions in Aggressive Erotic Films as a Fac-
tor in Violence Against Women, in id. at 233; Kutchinsky, The Effect of Easy Availa-
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The third concern, related to the second, is that pornographic
images of women tend to damage women's reputation as women. 1 5 The
reputation of women can be damaged in ways that men's cannot.
Images of individual women who emerge from the private sphere gen-
eralize easily to all women; the token woman represents her gender. In
contrast, the actions and qualities of individual men are not so easily
generalized. Men are persons, whereas women are women. 1 ' Porno-
graphic portrayals of individual women thus harm all women.
Feminists argue that if these considerations about women's inter-
ests in pornography are taken more seriously than conventional male-
biased moral theory would take them, a strong and unambiguous con-
demnation of pornography is justified.
B. Feminist Theories for the Regulation of Obscenity and
Pornography
1. Defining Pornography
Pornography is currently regulated by excluding obscenity from
first amendment protection. The legal definition of obscenity makes it
clear that regulation is oriented towards conservative concerns.117 The
use of a feminist definition of pornography would make the regulation
of pornography more sensitive to feminist concerns.
By choice, feminists define pornography rather than obscenity.
Obscenity is a relatively subjective term, connoting an offense to de-
cency, whereas pornography denotes a relatively specific and popularly
identified class of materials.11 ' Because the feminist argument empha-
sizes the role of such materials in maintaining male domination, rather
bility of Pornography on the Incidence of Sex Crimes: The Danish Experience, in id. at
295; Malamuth & Check, Penile Tumescence and Perceptual Responses to Rape as a
Function of Victim's Perceived Reactions, in id. at 257; Russell, Research on How
Women Experience the Impact of Pornography, in id. at 213; Zillman, Bryant,
Comisky & Medoff, Excitation and Hedonic Violence in the Effect of Erotica on Moti-
vated Intermale Aggression, in id. at 275; see also H. EYSENCK & D. NIAS, supra
note 89; Gray, Exposure to Pornography and Aggression Toward Women: The Case of
the Angry Male, 29 Soc. PROBS. 387 (1982). See generally G. BYERLY & R. RUIBIN,
PORNOGRAPHY: THE CONFLICT OVER SEXUALLY EXPLICIT MATERIALS IN THE
UNITED STATES: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1980); C. WILSON, VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 85-99 (1981).
I'l S. GRIFFIN, supra note 10, 111-19; Tong, supra note 81, at 10-12.
"6 See Garry, supra note 103, at 407-10.
117 See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
118 Richards, supra note 40, at 47-51, 55-56. Richards discusses the etymology of
the words "obscene" and "pornography" and concludes that to label something obscene
is to condemn it, whereas to label it as pornographic is, to a greater extent, merely to
describe it. See id. at 47-51, 55-56.
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than its offensiveness, the term pornography is preferred.
One feminist attempting to redefine pornography advocates defin-
ing pornography as "verbal or pictorial material which represents or
describes sexual behavior that is degrading or abusive to one or more of
the participants in such a way as to endorse the degradation."11 Al-
though this definition undoubtedly requires some clarification, particu-
larly as to the meaning of "endorse" and "degradation," it is arguably
no more vague than the current legal definition of obscenity. From a
feminist perspective its virtue is that it directs attention to the endorse-
ment of degradation and the approval of male domination, rather than
to the arousal of prurient interest. It thus reflects the feminist argument
that pornography concerns power rather than sex.
Some municipalities have recently considered antipornography
laws incorporating a feminist sense of the obscene. These proposals de-
fine pornography in terms of the manner in which women are
presented by the materials.120 However, much of the material within
9 Longino, Pornography, Oppression, and Freedom: A Closer Look, in TAKE
BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN AND PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at 43. Some feminists
use far looser definitions. See, e.g., Yeamans, A Political-Legal Analysis of Pornogra-
phy, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at 248
(defining pornography as "any use of the media which equates sex and violence").
There are some suggestions that feminist objections to pornography are partly based on
the fact that it is sold for the sake of sexual stimulation. This parallels the pandering
idea elaborated in Ginzberg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 467-71 (1966). See, e.g.,
Ordinance Amending Title 7 of Minneapolis Code of Ordinances Relating to Civil
Rights § 4 (Dec. 30, 1983) (Jan. 5, 1984); Russell & Lederer, supra note 99, at 27
("Pornography is not made to educate but to sell, and ... what sells in a sexist society
is a bunch of lies about women and sex.") Some criticism from within the feminist
movement can be found in English, Hollibaugh & Rubin, supra note 13, at 56-57.
120 See supra note 12. The Minneapolis ordinance begins by defining pornogra-
phy as "the sexually explicit subordination of women, graphically depicted, whether in
pictures or in words." Ordinance Amending Title 7 of Minneapolis Code of Ordi-
nances Relating to Civil Rights § 3(gg)(1) (Dec. 30, 1983) (Jan. 5, 1984). The defini-
tion is complicated, however, by the statute's delineation of nine components, of which
one or more must be present in pornographic works:
(i) women are presented as sexual objects, things, or commodities; or (ii)
women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or
(iii) women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleas-
ure in being raped; or (iv) women are presented as sexual objects tied up
or cut up or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt; or (v) women are
presented in postures of sexual submission; or (vi) women's body
parts-including but not limited to vaginas, breasts, and buttocks-are ex-
hibited, such that women are reduced to those parts; or (vii) women are
presented as whores by nature; or (viii) women are presented being pene-
trated by objects or animals; or (ix) women are presented in scenarios of
degradation, injury, abasement, torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleed-
ing, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual.
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this definition is protected under current laws.121 The question thus
posed by feminist arguments is whether there are persuasive reasons to
prefer this definition to the now-prevailing Miller standard.
2. Feminist Theories Supporting Legal Regulation of Pornography
Feminist concerns regarding pornography generate three theories
supporting regulation: that pornography causes failures of the market-
place of ideas, that it causes harms, and that it libels women as a
group.122 Feminists argue that women have generally been excluded
from the marketplace of ideas, which the first amendment is designed to
protect.123 Men dominate the sphere of public speech, often with the aid
of law.1 4 The marketplace of ideas cannot promote truth or democracy
when historical injustices handicap half the population. 25 Based upon
this theory, women may legitimately demand some special consideration
aimed at promoting their participation in the marketplace of ideas or at
protecting them from the abuse and exploitation permitted by a mar-
ketplace that ignores their concerns.
This failure of the marketplace may justify state regulation of por-
nography. Feminists argue that pornography is a male preserve, a criti-
cism no less valid because it can be applied to almost all aspects of
121 Compare the feminist definitions with the standard delineated by the Supreme
Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973).
122 It should be noted that these three theories are interrelated in their reliance
upon the feminist account of the silencing of women and their concerns, particularly in
the sphere of sexuality. See generally A. DWORKIN, supra note 10; S. GRIFFIN, supra
note 10. To the extent that this account is the basis of the argument that the market-
place of ideas has failed, that theory underlies the other two.
122 See supra note 86 and accompanying text; Dworkin, For Men, Freedom of
Speech; for Women, Silence Please, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOG-
RAPHY, supra note 10, at 256-58. See generally J. ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE
WOMAN (1981); S. GRIFFIN, supra note 10.
124 See, e.g., L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLU-
TION 4-5 (1969). Although there are no direct legal prohibitions of women's participa-
tion in the public sphere, disproportionate burdens in the private sphere make it impos-
sible for women to participate equally; housework, childcare, and the emotional
maintenance of personal relationships is work done almost entirely by women. See A.
OAKLEY, THE SOCIOLOGY OF HOUSEWORK (1974); MOTHERING: ESSAYS IN FEMI-
NIST THEORY 135-65 (J. Trebilcot ed. 1984); Hartmann, The Family as the Locus of
Gender, Class, and Political Struggle: The Example of Housework, 6 SIGNS: J.
WOMEN CULTURE & Soc. 366, 377-86 (1981).
125 Karst articulates a theoretical justification for treating equality as a value
served by the first amendment. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First
Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 23-26 (1975). He construes the principle to un-
dermine "content discrimination" and obscenity laws in particular. See id. at 19-32.
But see Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 113, 135-139 (1981).
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culture.126 In fact, recognizing that pornography is a part of sexist soci-
ety actually strengthens the feminist argument that the marketplace of
ideas truly has failed. Sexism is articulated, expressed, and endorsed by
the cultural phenomenon of pornography. This male preserve in which
women are abused and exploited plays a crucial role in the silencing of
women. Certainly discussion of sexuality is dominated and distorted by
pornographic images that bar the articulation of a genuine female sexu-
ality.12 7 The feminist argument thus leads to the conclusion that the
suppression of pornography would remove a barrier to women's partic-
ipation in the marketplace of ideas.
A second doctrinal argument in support of regulation is that por-
nography harms women. This argument differs from the usual harm-
oriented conservative justification for regulation in that it emphasizes
different harms and different mechanisms by which the harms occur.
Thus far, liberals and conservatives have ignored women's interests in
pornography. When these interests are systematically considered in
light of the evidence regarding pornography's harms, it is plausible that
the government's interest in suppressing pornography is strong enough




Although feminists should be reluctant to accept a two-tier or mul-
titier theory of the first amendment or a narrow construction of what
kind of speech the first amendment protects, if these arguments are ac-
cepted, feminist considerations add weight to the view that pornography
is harmful. At the least, if the feminist account of pornography is more
plausible than the conservative account, there is greater reason than is
now offered to deny pornography the protection of the first amendment.
In fact, the feminist emphasis on violence as the causal link between
pornography and harm may well be more plausible than the conserva-
tive emphasis on prurience.
1 29
128 See, e.g., S. GRIFFIN, WOMAN AND NATURE: THE ROARING INSIDE HER
(1978); Rich, Afterword, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY,
supra note 10, at 313.
127 Bonnie Klein, the director of the feminist antipornography movie, Not A Love
Story: A Film About Pornography, originally set out to make an erotic film but found
that "woman's sexual imagery had been co-opted by the 'male entertainment' indus-
try." This discovery prompted her to make the documentary. Off Our Backs, April
1982, at 20. Dworkin, emphasizes the similarities between pornographers and sexolo-
gists. A. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 178-98.
128 This is especially true if a "positive" conception of freedom is adopted, as femi-
nists urge. S. GRIFFIN, supra note 10, at 1; Longino, supra note 119, at 51-53; Rus-
sell, supra note 99, at 29; see also Clark, Liberalism and Pornography, in PORNOG-
RAPHY AND CENSORSHIP, supra note 50, at 45.
129 The link between media violence and behavior is far better substantiated than
any link between media sexuality and behavior. See H. EYSENCK & D. NIAs, supra
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Feminist criticism of pornography leads to a third theory of regu-
lation: that pornography libels women as a group. In Beauharnais v.
IllinoisI30 the Supreme Court upheld a group libel law against a first
amendment challenge. The challenged law made it unlawful to publish
or exhibit a portrayal of "depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of
virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion" that
would expose that group to "contempt, derision, or obloquy." ' The
Court held that instances of group libel affect the reputation of the
groups defamed and thereby harm individual members of the group.132
Thus it was permissible for the Illinois legislature to enact the law as
part of its attempt to deal with problems fostered by racial and reli-
gious tensions and violence.'33
Beauharnais has not been explicitly overruled, but most commen-
tators"3 and some lower courts1 35 have questioned its continued validity.
Some recent work, however, has argued that group libel doctrine is not,
or should not be, dead.' Group libel theory justifies the regulation of
vilifying speech that is aimed at vulnerable, historically oppressed
groups on the theory that such speech operates "nonrationally" and
therefore cannot be effectively counteracted by opposing speech,137 par-
ticularly speech by or on behalf of the vilified group.' This theory
note 89.
110 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
131 Id. at 251 (quoting ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 471 (Smith-Hurd 1949) (re-
pealed 1961)).
12 See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 262.
133 Id. at 259-62.
134 See, e.g., F. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SocIErY 90-99 (1981).
Haiman argues that Beauharnais found group libel theory to be valid by relying upon
analogies to individual libel and fighting words. These doctrines, he reasons, have since
been undermined by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel),
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (fighting words), and Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U.S. 518 (1972) (fighting words). But cf Smolla, Let The Author Beware: The Rejuve-
nation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 11 (1983) (arguing that
doctrinal confusion is one of the causes of the recent rejuvenation of American libel
law).
135 See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1205 (7th Cir.) (discussing abroga-
tion of Beauharrais and holding that that case does not make first amendment inappli-
cable to prohibition of Nazi march), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
116 E.g., Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.J. 308 (1979) (distin-
guishing group libel from group vilification by relying primarily on Meiklejohn's nar-
row first amendment theory); cf. Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Ra-
cial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982)
(endorsing tort action over first amendment objections).
I37 See Delgado, supra note 136, at 135-49; Note, supra note 136, at 317-22.
138 Paradoxically, in cases involving a group in particular need of protection, be-
cause of the listener's tendency to believe that the group is somehow inferior, this belief
also prevents the listener from taking the group's views seriously. For a discussion of
women's experience in this area, see Frye, supra note 87, at 74-79.
524 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
depends on controversial, but plausible, psychological assumptions and
suggests that the law should countenance civil or criminal sanctions
against the dissemination of hate literature aimed at disadvantaged
groups.13 9
Feminist arguments characterize pornography as a species of hate
literature, parallel to pamphlets vilifying blacks or Jews. It falsely por-
trays women as finding self-fulfillment in sexual submission to the vio-
lent will of men and conveys this image in a manner that bypasses the
critical faculties of its audience. By portraying women as whores, 140 it
thereby encourages both men and women to take women's interests less
seriously than men's.141 This is a denial of women's humanity, dignity,
and self-respect.
1 42
3. Forms of Legal Regulation
There are many ways in which the law could regulate pornogra-
phy. To the extent that pornography is not protected by the first
amendment, outright suppression through criminal laws is the most ob-
vious possibility.1 43 Some sort of regulatory scheme, involving licensing
or taxes, is also possible.' 44 The direct involvement of the state in any
regulatory scheme would involve first amendment problems similar to
those posed by criminalization, but, to the extent that regulatory
schemes may be viewed as time, place, or manner restrictions, their
permissible scope may be somewhat wider than that of criminal stat-
utes. 45 First amendment procedural requirements 146 are likely to make
such regulatory schemes unworkable, however.
In terms of feasibility and political strategy, civil actions may pro-
"'0 This nonneutral principle, as articulated here, depends in part on the market
failure argument. See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
140 See A. DWORKIN, supra note 10 (especially chapters 6 and 7. The word por-
nography derives from Greek in which it meant the "depiction of the lowest whores."
Id. at 200. See also Ordinance Amending Title 7 of Minneapolis Code of Ordinances
Relating to Civil Rights § 3 (Dec. 30, 1983) (vetoed Jan. 5, 1984).
141 Tong, supra note 81, at 4; see Garry, supra note 103, at 397-405, 413-16.
142 See Hill, Servility and Self-Respect, 57 THE MONIST 87 (1973).
14' This is the form of most present-day obscenity laws. See supra note 4; see also
Feinberg, supra note 56, at 567-68.
144 It might even be possible to compel the pornography industry to support shel-
ters for battered women or rape crisis centers by some sort of tax transfer scheme. It
appears that no one has ever proposed such a plan.
145 See e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (upholding statute prohib-
iting promotion of sexual performances by minors); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726 (1978) (upholding statute forbidding broadcasters from using "any obscene, inde-
cent, or profane language" on radio); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50
(1976) (upholding portions of zoning ordinance regulating "adult" movie theaters).
146 See F. SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 206-227.
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vide a preferable approach. The strength of legislatively designed tort
actions, such as the Minneapolis ordinance," lies in their form as
amendments to municipal civil rights laws. They treat pornography as
"a form of discrimination based on sex."14 The state role is confined to
adjudication, and the factual presentation of the cases is left to those
who claim to be harmed. This allows feminist plaintiffs to exercise
some control over the development of claims under the statutes.
IV. AN EVALUATION OF THE FEMINIST APPROACH
A. Questions About the Feminist Account of Pornography
Three challenges can be made to the feminist interpretation of
pornography. The first is a challenge to the feminists' universalization
of "men" and "women." Proponents of this challenge deemphasize gen-
der and instead emphasize that responses to pornography vary accord-
ing to the individual and that many women respond positively to por-
nography whereas some men respond negatively. 49 This argument
misses the feminists' point, however. Gender-conscious analysis is ap-
propriate for a number of reasons. First, there appear to be empirical
differences in male and female responses to pornography. 50 Moreover,
because individual perceptions of pornography may depend on psycho-
logical predispositions, it is important to view empirical data
critically.'
51
A defense of the feminist analysis leads to more serious challenges
147 See Ordinance Amending Title 7 of Minneapolis Ordinances Relating to Civil
Rights (Dec. 30, 1983) (vetoed Jan. 5, 1984) The Minneapolis ordinance would have
created a cause of action for any person coerced into pornographic performances, for
any person who has pornography forced upon him or her, and for any person assaulted
in a way directly caused by pornography. See id. §§ 5-7. The Ordinance would have
also created a cause of action for any woman "as a woman acting against the subordi-
nation of women." Id. § 4.
14B Id. § 3. The doctrinal justification offered in support of this treatment of por-
nography is similar to that usually given for affirmative action or for legislation under
section five of the fourteenth amendment. Such an argument would begin by positing
that we face a conflict between two constitutional values-equality and liberty. The
argument would then propose that the conflict be resolved in favor of equality because
the alleviation of women's oppression must take precedence over the rights of
pornographers.
'4' This raises the issue of whether women's participation in the pornography in-
dustry is truly voluntary. See, e.g., supra note 111 and accompanying text.
11o See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
151 The point here is not simply that perspective influences experience, but that
some perspectives may be better than others. Although there will always be disputes
about the relative superiority or inferiority of perspectives, this argument does not im-
ply that all perspectives are equal. It necessarily entails that the issue cannot by settled
only by reference to data on people's experience.
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concerning feminist assumptions about sexuality. The feminist account
assumes that sex can be divorced from violence and domination, yet this
may not be true. A conservative analysis of this issue would link male
sexuality to aggression and dominance by arguing that a man's potency
depends on feelings of power and control, perhaps even hostility.152 Fe-
male sexuality is correspondingly passive and submissive; hardly con-
sidered to be a sex drive at all.158 Thus the conservative argument con-
cludes that pornography depicts sex as it is and has to be for men.
Applying this conclusion to the issue of regulation, the conservative
would then argue that sexuality and sexually-oriented materials must
be controlled because the liberation of male sexuality is the liberation of
hostility and antisocial feelings, particularly feelings against women.
Conservative opposition to sexuality and sexually-oriented materials
can therefore be seen as motivated by a form of respect for women.'
In contrast, a liberal analysis of the claim that there is a necessary
connection between aggression and sexuality would point to the inten-
sity of the desires aroused in sex. x55 Thus this view also argues that
sexual activity must have a tinge of aggression. Similarly, this account
of the matter concludes by charging that feminists merely want sex to
be sensuous cuddling, devoid of passion.'
58
Although a full answer to this criticism would require considera-
tion of sexological research beyond the scope of this paper, suffice it to
say that feminists flatly deny that male and female sexuality are neces-
sarily dominant and submissive, x5 7 and they attribute any sadomasoch-
istic elements of sex5' to socialization rather than genetics. Feminists
152 This theory is at least partially embodied in the language. See generally SEX-
IST LANGUAGE: A MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS (Vetterling-Braggin ed. 1981)
(examining sexist language and its relation to male domination and female subordina-
tion); R. LAKOFF, LANGUAGE AND WOMAN'S PLACE (1975) (analyzing sexist language
as indicative of the speaker's true feelings regarding women); Baker, "Pricks" and
"Chicks": A Plea for "Persons", in PHILOSOPHY & SEX, supra note 48, at 45.
153 This view of sexuality was certainly the dominant one before Kinsey; perhaps
it still is. See B. FAUST, supra note 13, at 6.
15 See Garry, supra note 103, at 396-97 (distinguishing the respect for women
that conservatives support from that urged by feminists).
155 See, e.g., Mitzel, The District Attorney is a Girl's Best Friend: Feminists and
the Anti-Porn Crusade, GAY NEWS, Aug. 7, 1981, at 17.
158 See B. FAUST, supra note 13, at 49 (discussing Kinsey); E. Willis, Feminism,
Moralism, and Pornography, in BEGINNING TO SEE THE LIGHT: PIECES OF A DEC-
ADE 223-25 (1981).
117 See, e.g., S. HITE, THE HITE REPORT: A NATIONWIDE STUDY OF FEMALE
SEXUALITY (1976) (especially 465-770); POWERS OF DESIRE (A. Snitow, C. Stansell &
S. Thompson eds. 1983); 3 HERESIES: A FEMINIST PUBLICATION ON ART & POLITICS
#12, 1981 (Sex Issue); 5 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & Soc. 569 (special issue); 6
SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC. 1 (1980).
158 The view that sex is inevitably sadomasochistic is sometimes attributed to Sar-
tre, although the sadomasochism is not inevitably male-female. See Collins & Pierce,
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may acknowledge that sex has a passionate dimension, particularly for
men as they have been socialized. Yet, they would further argue that to
the extent that sex may be intrinsically "violent" the violence ought to
be equally distributed among men and women, in contrast to current
pornography.15
A final challenge to the feminist account of pornography builds on
the doubts raised by the preceding challenge. 6 ' The argument is that
men and women do indeed have different sexual styles.'M These styles
are in part genetic, but they are reinforced and amplified by a culture
that is undeniably biased in favor of men. Pornography is a genre of
male fantasy in which women are portrayed as having a male sexuality;
that is, they are aroused by what arouses men. Male fantasies are
somewhat aggressive and degrading to women, and this is unfortunate,
but pornography is nonetheless part of a legitimate masculine style, a
style which is more visual, less tactile, more instrumental, less expres-
sive, more lustful, less loving. These differences are ultimately irreduci-
ble, although some women have masculine styles, and vice versa. The
difference in sexual styles may be illustrated by comparing pornogra-
phy to what is often considered the parallel phenomenon for women:
romance.' 2 Romance differs from pornography in that its eroticism is
emotional, diffuse, and inexplicit rather than functional, pointed, and
explicit. Yet, what excites women's fantasies in romance is the very
same male power that pornography glorifies. Here, too, no attractive
image of sexual equality is either portrayed or sought.163 This analysis
therefore concludes that a greater equality between men and women
must be achieved if we are to overcome the sense that the masculine
style is the only style. With greater equality, masculine and feminine
sexual styles will remain different but will be equal.' 4
This interpretation of pornography undermines the feminist posi-
tion. It acknowledges that current pornography is too violent and de-
grading to women but suggests that pornography is a fantasy genre
Holes and Slime: Sexism in Sartre's Psychoanalysis, in WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY,
supra note 107, at 112; Oaklander, Sartre on Sex, in PHILOSOPHY OF SEX 190 (A.
Soble ed. 1980).
'5 See supra note 97. But see English, Hollibaugh, & Rubin, supra note 13, at
57-58.
160 This argument follows that of B. FAUST, supra note 13.
161 Id. at 45-59.
162 B. FAUST, supra note 13, at 98.
163 See English, Hollibaugh & Rubin, supra note 13, at 54-55.
16 Faust and Safilios-Rothschild express concern about whether men and women
are fundamentally incompatible. See B. FAUST, supra note 13, at 187-204; C.
SAFILIOS-ROTHSCHILD, supra note 161; see also Rapaport, On the Future of Love:
Rousseau and the Radical Feminists, in WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 107,
at 185.
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tailored to a legitimate erotic style. In response to this challenge, many
feminists may be willing to modify their positions."0 5 Many others,
however, will argue that although masculine and feminine sexual styles
do exist, they are a product of male-dominated society rather than of
genetics.
B. Questions About the Use of Law to Regulate Pornography
1. The Liberal Critique of the Feminist Position
Although it is not absolute, first amendment protection is broad in
scope.'66 The courts have not, however, wholly refrained from limiting
speech. Regulation must be pursued in the least restrictive manner pos-
sible,' 67 but some inhibitions of first amendment freedoms have been
permitted. 68 The strongest doctrinal criticisms of the feminist position
therefore flow from the work of liberal commentators rather than the
courts.'6 9 These criticisms are all traceable to the liberal position that
regulations on speech should be minimal, if they are legitimate.170 As a
result, liberal evaluations of specific feminist proposals all tend to gen-
erate the criticism that they necessitate government evaluation of the
content of works.
The liberals' main problem with the feminist argument, then, is
that it interprets pornography as political speech, and hence, inadver-
tently implies that it must be given full first amendment protection.' 7
In addition, it is settled law that the advocacy of what some legislature
161 See, e.g., English, Hollibaugh, & Rubin, supra note 13, at 54-55 (more female
pornographers would break down harmful pornographic gender hierarchy).
116 See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977) (employees'
right to refuse to associate sufficient to prevent union from spending dues on political
activities unrelated to collective bargaining); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546, 552-58 (1975) (holding unconstitutional denial of use of municipal audi-
torium based on content of program); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963)
(litigation by NAACP to further objectives of racial equality is protected political ex-
pression). But see Kairys, Freedom of Speech, in THE POLrrTcs OF LAW: A PROGRES-
SIVE CRITIQUE 140, 141 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) (broad right of free speech is a relatively
recent development).
167 See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
168 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869-72 (1982) (plurality opin-
ion) (partially limiting school board's discretion to remove books from library); Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (speech intended to incite or produce immi-
nent lawless action and likely to incite or produce such may be restricted).
189 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 19. But see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
508-14 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that freedom of speech and press be
given broadest possible application).
170 See supra notes 40-41.
171 See Kaminer, Pornography and the First Amendment: Prior Restraints and
Private Action, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note
10, at 246.
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believes is a dangerous ideology cannot be made illegal.1" 2 Furthermore,
it is difficult to argue that individual pieces of pornography, however
much they implicitly endorse the degradation of the women portrayed,
advocate clearly that all women should be or are degraded. Thus femi-
nists would have to grant the government the power to interpret the
message expressed in a wide range of materials in order to identify
materials that advocate harm to women.
173
Feminists justify government intervention primarily by reference
to the market failure theory, arguing that something needs to be done to
help end the silencing of women and equalize the voices of men and
women in the marketplace of ideas. A preliminary response to this the-
ory might attack its factual premises by denying that pornography
dominates and distorts the articulation of women's sexual sensibility.
One can point to the romance industry17 and to publications that study
and discuss women's sexual perspective as evidence that the market-
place has not failed to accommodate women's voices.175 Another re-
sponse might be to point out the degree to which other aspects of cul-
ture are male monopolies. Feminists must explain what distinguishes
pornography from other expressions of male dominance.
176
Even accepting the feminist account of pornography as a market
failure, the theory is problematic because it justifies government inter-
vention to assure equal or adequate access to the marketplace of
ideas.' 77 Equality and adequacy, however, remain vague; specification
of their meaning will usually presuppose some conception of what a
properly functioning marketplace would look like. Market failure the-
ory therefore grants the government authority to decide how the mar-
ketplace of ideas should look.
This criticism of the feminist account of the market failure theory
also applies to the feminist argument that the harms of pornography
justify its suppression. If pornography is viewed as an expression of
17 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969); Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298, 312-27 (1957).
171 See infra notes 188-96 and accompanying text.
174 B. FAUST, supra note 13, at 146-56 (discussing romantic fiction directed at
women readers).
175 See, e.g., L. BARBACH, FOR YOURSELF: THE FULFILLMENT OF FEMALE SEX-
UALITY (1975); B. DODSON, LIBERATING MASTURBATION (1974); N. FRIDAY, MY
SECRET GARDEN: WOMEN'S SEXUAL FANTASIES (1973); S. HITE, THE HITE REPORT
(1976); S. KITZINGER, WOMEN'S EXPERIENCE OF SEXUALITY (1984); 3 HERESIES: A
FEMINIST PUBLICATION ON ART & POLITICS #12, 1981 (Sex Issue). Sex also seems to
have become a legitimate subject in women's magazines in recent years. See B. FAUST,
supra note 13, at 157-69.
170 See, e.g., English, Hollibaugh & Rubin, supra note 13, at 55, 60-61.
'71 Professor Baker distinguishes four versions of market failure models. See
Baker, supra note 19, at 981-85. The argument that follows repeats Baker's analysis.
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political ideology, 17 its regulation should be subject to the "clear and
present danger" test. Because the harms of pornography are still dis-
puted and its consequences, even by the feminist account, are indirect,
pornography does not pose a "clear and present danger" under the
standards that the courts have thus far established. If pornography is
nonetheless suppressed by reason of its harms, the standards governing
such regulations will have been diluted. The danger of political expres-
sion will no longer have to be clear or present in order for its suppres-
sion to be justified, and the government will be able to identify other
dangerous ideologies to be suppressed.
Feminists might respond, at this point, that if pornography is po-
litical speech, its politics are implicit, not explicit.1 7 9 Only when it is
analyzed and understood, which it almost never is, can its women-hat-
ing message be seen. This response, however, puts feminists in a di-
lemma by forcing them to choose between this view and the group libel
theory. Furthermore, the materials to which a group libel law could be
applied would have to clearly vilify the group in question, 8 ° yet por-
nography does not meet this standard of clarity. Attempts to identify
individual pieces of pornography that do meet this standard of clarity
would again engage the government in evaluating the content of speech.
2. Alternate Conceptions of Regulation
The crux of the liberal critique of feminist theories is that by ad-
vocating regulation of pornography feminists condone the use of gov-
ernment to evaluate speech. Feminists may respond by arguing nonneu-
trally that pornography should be subject to legal restriction because it
really is dangerous, whereas advocacy of socialism, for example, is not.
This kind of argument has some attraction, particularly for feminists
who are conscious of the extent of private coercion that has been exer-
cised against women under the legal regime of public neutrality. 8
Feminists would replace this regime of public neutrality with a
17' Although feminists certainly want to claim that pornography expresses an ide-
ology, it is not clear whether it is properly characterized as a political ideology. This is
a general problem with "women's issues"; hence the feminist slogan, "the personal is
political." See Nicholson, "The Personal Is Political": An Analysis in Retrospect, 7
Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 85 (1981); cf. J. ELSHTAIN, supra note 123, at 320-23 (argu-
ing for preservation of a purely personal sphere).
17 This is part of the basis for arguing that it "bypasses the conscious faculties of
its hearer." Note, supra note 136, at 317-18.
"' See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 750-51 (4th ed. 1971)
(limitations on tort of group libel include requirement of showing "some reasonable
personal application of the words" to the specific persons claiming injury).
... Dworkin is particularly outspoken in her analysis of the hypocrisy of those
who neutrally defend freedom of speech. See A. DWORKIN, supra note 10.
[Vol. 133:497
FEMINISM, PORNOGRAPHY, AND LAW
regime oriented towards their vision of true neutrality, expressed in
terms of equality. Feminists, like conservatives, are willing to
subordinate individual liberty to a particular vision of the good commu-
nity. As has been noted,"8 2 however, the feminist vision of community
differs from the conservative vision. Not all nonliberal theories are con-
servative.1 8 Although feminists and conservatives both argue that lib-
erty can be realized only in a community that socializes its members to
share certain values,"" conservatives argue that liberty entails virtue
while feminists argue that it entails equality. 5
In the feminist account current noninterference with individual
liberties is not really neutral; rather, it is an endorsement of the status
quo. The status quo thus endorsed is more than a failed marketplace of
ideas; culture itself is a male construct that inhibits the equality of
women."8 6 Feminists therefore challenge the neutrality that protects the
sex industry by linking their use of legal regulation to a conception of
social change. In the feminist vision regulation of pornography is part.
of a larger goal of actively promoting women's participation in culture
and protecting women from being perpetually silenced.
Thus, the feminist argument is not that the government should
determine whether or not a given book is presenting women as whores
by nature; rather, it is that the government should be helping to eradi-
cate the view that women are whores by nature by regulating works
that present this view.18 7 The result of such regulation would be the
transformation of culture into a sphere sufficiently shared by men and
women that the neutral principle of noninterference would truly be ef-
fective. However, this argument for the legal regulation of pornography
is open to some serious objections regarding the wisdom of its underly-
ing political assumptions.
182 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
183 See, e.g., R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975).
'" Longino, Pornography, Oppression, and Freedom: A Closer Look, in TAKE
BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at 50-53; see also S.
GRIFFIN, supra note 10, at 88-93 (discussing pornographer's definition of liberty).
18I For the classical argument against such conceptions of positive liberty, see Ber-
lin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR EssAYs ON LIBERTY 118 "(1969); see also Karst,
supra note 125.
188 See, e.g., S. GRIFFIN, supra note 11; Ortner, Is Female to Male as Nature Is
to Culture?, in WOMEN, CULTURE & SOCIETY 67 (M. Rosaido & L. Lamphere eds.
1974).
187 For an example of such a regulation, see Ordinance Amending Title 7 of Min-
neapolis Code of Ordinances Relating to Civil Rights § 3 (Dec. 30, 1983) (vetoed Jan.
5, 1984).
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3. Strategic Considerations Regarding the Use of Law
Invoking the law to suppress the dissemination of pornographic
images raises difficult political issues for feminists. Freedom of expres-
sion, particularly freedom of sexual and political expression, is crucial
to any feminist program of social reform.188 Furthermore, the state has
long been an instrument of male domination. 8 Thus an evaluation of
the use of legal regulation cannot focus simply on traditional doctrinal
arguments but must also consider broader questions of political
strategy.
Strategic considerations regarding feminist opposition to pornogra-
phy begin with the decision of whether the issue should be addressed at
all. Pornography may not be as important as feminists claim; perhaps it
is more an effect than a cause of male domination. If this is the case,
then feminists should turn their attention to basic causes of pornogra-
phy, such as inequality in family and work. Their elimination may
cause pornographic expressions of male domination to wither away. In
the meantime, emphasizing pornography diverts energy away from
more important issues and alienates liberal allies of feminism. This ar-
gument merits consideration by feminists as an important strategic is-
sue, but it does not threaten their basic moral argument. Even if por-
nography is primarily a cultural symptom, it nonetheless plays a role in
reproducing male dominance and merits condemnation on that account.
Strategic objections to the feminists' legal arguments have consid-
erably more force than objections to their account of pornography and
its social role. The first strategic objection is that male-dominated legal
institutions are unlikely to be sensitive to the feminist perspective on
pornography and are certain to be sensitive to what they perceive to be
first amendment values. Furthermore, even if the law can be made at-
tentive to feminist concerns, the legal principles on which feminists
need to rely are dangerously vague or overbroad and tend to approve
exercises of government power that may be more dangerous to women's
liberation than pornography. 9 ' If feminists argue that the dangerous
188 In fact obscenity laws have often been used against materials feminists would
endorse, such as those of birth control advocate Margaret Sanger. See Alschuler, Ori-
gins of the Law of Obscenity, 2 TECHNICAL REPORTS, supra note 66, at 65, 79 (antiob-
scenity laws historically connected with legal sanctions against other sexual conduct).
18" See MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Femi-
nist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & Soc. 635 (1983); MacKinnon,
Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS: J.
WOMEN CULTURE & Soc. 515 (1982); MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence,
34 STAN. L. REV. 703, 717-19, 723-37 (1982).
... Legislative or judicial control of pornography is simply not possible
without breaking down the legal principles and procedures that are essen-
[Vol. 133:497
FEMINISM, PORNOGRAPHY, AND LAW
ideas expressed in pornography justify suppression of it, they must ac-
cept the possibility that the government's notion of dangerousness will
differ from theirs. In fact, viewed in historical context, a relaxation of
constitutional protection for "dangerous ideas" is far more likely to
open feminists and their allies to legal harassment than to promote
their political success.
Such harassment seems particularly likely given that, in our soci-
ety, feminists do not generally express widely shared values, particu-
larly on pornography. Enduring nonneutral principles must rest on a
community's shared values.191 Feminists may argue, along lines similar
to traditional "Marxist" ones, 92 that their values may become shared
once the government enforces them. After a period of such enforcement,
the argument goes, other members of the community would become en-
lightened and would see pornography as feminists do.
There may be circumstances in which the end justifies the means
in the way that this argument requires, but these do not seem to obtain
in the case of pornography. It is more plausible when, as Marx
imagined, the entire working class-the majority of society-actively
participates in the exercise of state power. Moreover, Marx advocated
total change, change for which it may be necessary to employ drastic
means. In cases of one isolated cultural phenomenon, such as pornogra-
phy, the Marxist argument loses force. It therefore seems wiser to think
that pornography will wither away as feminist values somehow become
more widely shared than to think that governmental enforcement of
feminist values in the form of anti-pornography laws will cause them to
be more widely shared.193
Does this mean, especially given the nagging question of how to
facilitate the sharing of feminist values, that feminists should eschew
legal regulation completely? The arguments considered above may take
the law too seriously as an instrument of certain ends and not seriously
tial to our own right to speak. . . . We must continue to organize against
pornography . . . , but we must not ask the government to take up our
struggle for us. The power it will assume to do so will be far more dan-
gerous to us all than the "power" of pornography.
Kaminer, Pornography and the First Amendment, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT, supra
note 10, at 247. See also Willis, Feminism, Moralism, and Pornography, in BEGIN-
NING TO SEE THE LIGHT: PIECES OF A DECADE, supra note 13, at 226.
191 See R. UNGER, supra note 183.
192 See, e.g., Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program, in THE MARX-ENGELS
READER 382 (1972). It is debatable whether Marx would have endorsed the theory
outlined in the text.
193 But see Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First
Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 293 (1982). Professor Baker insightfully explores this
underdeveloped area in first amendment theory and concludes that arguments like that
made in the text generally should be rejected.
1985]
534 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
enough as a symbolic expression of social values. Thus there may be
some value in the symbolic and educational effect of compelling the
government to grapple with the feminist analysis as it is presented
through statutory proposals and litigious discourse.19 4 The Minneapolis
ordinance made headlines and caused people to consider why a City
Council found it plausible to think that pornography is a form of sex
discrimination. The law does not simply stand outside controversies
over basic values; it is inevitably a participant.
Justice Brandeis once observed that "[f]ear of serious injury alone
cannot justify suppression of free speech . . . . Men feared witches and
burnt women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage
of irrational fears."' 95 The long silence about the concerns that animate
feminist opposition to pornography is evidence that neither men nor
women are yet free from the bondage of irrational fears expressed in
pornography. As Brandeis suggested, use of the law to debate our basic
values may be a crucial strategy 9 by which feminists can make their
voices heard.
194 See Comment, On Letting the Laity Litigate: The Petition Clause and Unau-
thorized Practice Rules, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1515, 1520-28 (1984) (discussing rela-
tionship between government legitimacy and process of entertaining legal claims).
19 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
19 Although feminists do not necessarily agree on the strategy that should be
adopted to address the issues raised by pornography, see supra note 13 and accompany-
ing text, a host of strategies have been suggested. See, e.g., S. BROWNMILLER, supra
note 42, at 438-45; Garry, Pornography and Respect for Women, in PORNOGRAPHY
AND CENSORSHIP, supra note 50, at 61; Gever & Hall, Fighting Pornography, in
TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at 279; Morgan,
How to Run the Pornographers Out of Town (And Preserve the First Amendment),
Ms. Nov. 1978, at 55.
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